(a) INTENTIONAL.-A person's state of mind is intentional with respect to-(1) his conduct if it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct; or (2) a result of his conduct if it is his conscious objective or desire to cause the result.
(b) KNOWING.-A person's state of mind is knowing with respect to-
(1) his conduct if he is aware of the nature of his conduct; (2) an existing circumstance if he is aware or believes that the circumstance exists; or (3) a result of his conduct if he is aware or believes that his conduct is substantially certain to cause the result.
(c) REGKLESS.-A person's state of mind is reckless with respect to-
(1) an existing circumstance if he is aware of a substantial risk that the circumstance exists but disregards the risk; or (2) a result of his conduct if he is aware of a substantial risk that the result will occur but disregards the risk; except that awareness of the risk is not required if its absence is due to selfinduced intoxication. A substantial risk means a risk that is of such a nature and degree that to disregard it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in such a situation.
(d) NEGLIGENT.-A person's state of mind is negligent with respect to-
(1) an existing circumstance if he ought to be aware of a substantial risk that the circumstance exists; or (2) a result of his conduct if he ought to be aware of a substantial risk that the result will occur.
A substantial risk means a risk that is of such a nature and degree that to fail to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in such a situation. Both bills require culpability for each element of the offenses described in the criminal code, unless a statute expressly provides otherwise." Legislative silence is thus not to be taken as an indication that strict liability is to be imposed, as it occasionally has in the past. When we say that appellant's appearance in public is caused not by "his own" volition but rather by some other force, we are clearly thinking of a force that is nevertheless "his" except in some special sense. The accused undoubtedly commits the proscribed act and the only question is whether the act can be attributed to a part of "his" personality that should not be regarded as criminally responsible.
[T]he question whether an act is "involuntary" is, The least justifiable approach of all is that of the House bill, which inserts the requirement of voluntariness without defining it. Thus crimes by drug addicts, depredations by sociopaths, offenses by the culturally deprived, and even routine criminal behavior by ostensibly normal persons, given fairly common deterministic psychiatric assumptions, may produce tangled controversy and erratic patterns of conviction and exculpation.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia faced such a question in United States v. Moore, t7 holding that drug addiction was not a defense to its possession. The majority expressed a concern that to allow the defense could establish a principle that would apply to other illegal acts, such as robbery and even homicide, whose purpose was to obtain narcotics. There was a strong dissent:
Perhaps the most troublesome question arising out of recognition of the addiction defense I suggest is whether it should be limited only to those acts-such as mere possession for use-which are inherent in the disease itself. It can hardly be doubted that, at least in some instances, an addict may in fact be "compelled" to engage in other types of criminal activity in order to obtain sufficient funds to purchase his necessary supply of narcot- INTENT AND PURPOSE
The Senate and House bills both substitute the word "intent" for the Model Penal Code's "purpose" to designate the highest level of culpability.
2 1 The Senate Report indicates that the change is designed to achieve two objectives. First, the word "intent" is more familiar. Second, the word "purpose" may connote a particular purpose, rather than the desired meaning that the conduct be done purposely. 2 2 While this shift in terminology has been elected in a number of state codes patterned on the Model Penal Code, 23 the choice is questionable at best. The very familiarity of the word "intent" is probably disadvantageous for two reasons. It may be confused with its traditional meanings, which usually include knowledge as well as purpose, 2 4 although the use of the term is quite varied.
2 5
In addition, the confusion invited by the retention of "intent" may have had substantive consequences in the bills themselves. For example, the requisite intent to steal for the crime of larceny may be satisfied not only by the perpetrator having the true purpose that the owner lose the value of the property, but also by the mere knowledge that this will occur. Intent would probably even be met by having knowledge of a substantial risk that this will take place. 2 6 On the other hand, S. 1722 [Vol. 72 ownership, knowing that the effect is one of deprivation. 3 1 This objection is addressed by S. 1722 by alternatively allowing theft to be committed with an intent to appropriate. This comes closer to the mark described by purposeful conduct, as the focus is the benefit to the thief rather than the loss to the victim. "Appropriate" is not defined by the bill. The grading subsection 32 indicates that taking without consent of the owner will suffice, apparently irrespective of how temporary the deprivation, a view somewhat supported by the Senate Report. 33 The result, however, is to broaden the traditional general law of larceny, where intent to temporarily appropriate will not ordinarily suffice to constitute the offense.
3 4 H.R. 6915 is more restrictive in this respect. 35
C. CONDUCT, EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES, AND RESULTS
As noted previously, culpability is defined somewhat differently, depending upon whether the reference is to conduct, existing circumstances, or results.
3 6 Furthermore, if culpability is not specified for a particular offense, S. 1722 provides that the minimum culpability to be proven also varies with the element category. With respect to conduct it is "knowing," and for existing circumstances and results it is "reckless." '37 H.R. 6915 requires "knowing" for all three, in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary. 38 Neither S. 1722, nor the Model Penal Code, which formulated the scheme, provides a definition of what constitutes the conduct, circumstances, or results.
The well-known case of United States v. Short 39 may illustrate the problem. Short, an intoxicated American serviceman, attempted to have sexual relations with a Japanese woman, who apparently failed to communicate her nonconsent due to language difficulties as well as to Short's inebriation. He was charged with assault with intent to commit rape. At trial the court rejected a defense-requested instruction that the accused must have had knowledge of the victim's nonconsent. Short was convicted, and the judgment was affirmed on appeal. The majority reasoned that an exculpatory mistake must be reasonable. A dissent 31 The Model Penal Code provision which covers larceny requires a "purpose to deprive" with regard to movable property. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.2. The effect is awkwardly mitigated by defining "deprive" to include withholding and disposition making it unlikely that the owner will recover it. urged that, while the view of the majority was correct with respect to the crime of rape, assault with intent to rape required a purpose to rape, ie., to have sexual relations without consent.
Under S. 1722 the dissent would surely be correct with respect to a crime expressly requiring intent to rape. 40 Supposing the sex act to have
been consummated, what of a charge of rape? Both opinions in Short agreed that such a charge could not be negated by unreasonable mistake. They thus ruled that with respect to the nonconsent element, rape could be committed negligently. If this appears too modest a culpability requirement for so grave a crime, one may ask whether knowledge of nonconsent is required, or whether recklessness will suffice. The section of S. 1722 deffning rape 4 1 provides that a person is guilty of an offense if he compels another to participate in a sexual act by forcie or specified intimidation. To satisfy this provision the offender must utilize force or intimidation, and the victim must yield rather than consent to the act. Is the psychological response of the victim "conduct"? If so, the nonconsent must be known to the rapist. Or is it an "existing circumstance," as, strictly speaking, it is not the conduct of the actor? If it is a circumstance, the minimum culpability is "reckless." Either is arguable, and the bill contains no obvious answer. The Senate Report implies that the victim's response is part of the "conduct" 42 ("the element that the defendant compelled the other person to participate in the sexual act . . . is conduct"). No reason for this assertion is stated. Perhaps this conclusion represents a policy decision with respect to the appropriate culpability for the offense, yet the policies are neither identified nor discussed. 4 3 Perhaps it is based on formal deduction from the syntax and the absence of the traditional language of nonconsent from the definition of the offense. One writer closely associated with the legislative effort has taken such a view. 44 Feinberg notes that the kidnapping section 45 applies to one who "restrains another person." This, he states, would be purely "conduct," but for another section 46 defining "re- 40 On the other hand, if the charge were attempted rape, an intent to take without consent may not be required due to a relaxation of the culpability requirement in the general attempt section. S. 1722, supra note 3, § 1001(a). 41 Id. § 1641. 42 S. REP. No. 96-553 at 596. 43 Were the question of the appropriate culpability requirement for the victim's nonconsent separately faced, it would be necessary to justify exculpation from a charge of rape where the victim in fact did not consent and the defendant was aware of and disregarded a substantial risk that the victim had not consented, such disregard being a gross deviation from reasonable conduct in the face of the limited utility of the defendant's conduct. 44 [Vol. 72 straint" to mean restriction without consent. This, argues Feinberg, creates a conflict in the bill that the draftsmen have sought to resolve with legislative history in the Senate Report, which states that the nonconsent is an existing circumstance. The issue is analytically present irrespective of the inclusion of a definition of restraint. In any event, surely reliance on a committee report to define the culpability elements of federal criminal offenses is of doubtful desirability. While many courts might find a report persuasive, it would not be controlling, and some confusion and inconsistency in result may be anticipated in the decisions. In view of the subtlety of the drafting technique and its lack of clarity with respect to the status of complex verbs, adverbs, direct and indirect objects of verbs, participial phrases, and so forth, some courts may be expected to exercise caution by applying a higher minimum culpability than is desired.
One commentator has perceptively suggested that the conduct elements for each offense should be specified in each substantive section. 47 The added prolixity of the code could be minimized by the use of defined, more general terms, resulting in greater clarity and functional utility. For example, the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws defined "willfully" to include intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. 48 Alternatively, adequately detailed and comprehensive rules of construction should be included in the legislation itself. Errors as to elements of offenses are unlikely to be regarded as harmless ones.
D. KNOWLEDGE AND RECKLESSNESS
S. 1722 provides that where culpability is not specified in a particular offense, recklessness as to results and circumstances will suffice, although at least knowledge is required with respect to conduct. 49 H.R. 6915, on the other hand, requires at least knowledge for all three, absent a specific directive to the contrary. 5 0 While it is, of course, possible to arrive at the same position on a specific offense by using culpability language in that offense, the variant positions of the two bills on the suffi-47 Rothstein, Federal Criminal Code Revision: Some Problems with Culpability Provisions, 15 GRIM. L. BULL. 157, 160 (1979) . The question of what is a "result" of conduct may also not be free from controversy. E.g., S. 1722, supra note 3, § 1611, defines maiming in terms of intentionally causing serious bodily injury that is permanent or likely to be permanent. According to the Senate Report, the seriousness of the injury is a result, while its permanence is an "existing" circumstance. S. REP. No. 96-553 at 547. A commentator on the new Texas Penal Code asserts that the intent to commit a felony or theft in the offense of burglary is a "result," while the sex act in rape is both "conduct" and "result. ciency of recklessness represent different policy choices with respect to the minimum level of culpability which should ordinarily suffice.
The Senate view is consistent with that of the common law. As Professor Glanville Williams has observed:
It is a general, though not a universal, principle that recklessness is classed with intention for legal purposes. The thing that usually matters is not desire of consequence but merely foresight of consequence, which is the factor common to intention and recklessness. 5 1 It is this foresight of consequence that, it is submitted, constitutes mens rea. Consequently, every crime requiring mens rea, if it does not positively require intention, requires either intention or recklessness. 52 The S. 1722 provision also is consistent with the recommendation of the Model Penal Code: "Culpability Required Unless Otherwise Provided. When the culpability sufficient to establish a material element of an offense is not prescribed by law, such element is established if a person acts purposely, knowingly or recklessly with respect thereto. ' In view of the consensus of tradition, authority, and the strong policy which generally favors permitting penal liability to be predicated on the gross sort of recklessness defined by both bills, the contrary decision of H.R. 6915 presumably must bear the burden of persuasion for its aberrational position. Yet the House Report contains no reasoned argument for the committee proposal, merely citing four cases, all of which are inapposite. 56 
E. CULPABILITY ELEMENTS AND SPECIFIC INTENT
In generally addressing conduct, existing circumstances, and results, S. 1722 does not cover all of the important culpability referents of prevailing criminal law, which sometimes requires culpability independently of these factors. 5 7 A number of common crimes are said to require "specific intent." For example, S. 1722 defines burglary to include nocturnal entry of a dwelling of another with intent to commit a crime. 5 8 This last element is not the proscribed conduct, which is completed by the entry. It is not, strictly speaking, a result of the entry for it requires additional conduct by the offender, and it may never take place. It is probably not an "existing circumstance," as the context of that phrase indicates that factual circumstances, not the actor's state of mind, are meant. 5 9 Furthermore, S. 1722 makes knowledge the highest culpability with regard to knowledge of existing circumstances, not intent, on the apparent belief that one cannot intend circumstances. 60 As S. 1722 does not hesitate to include specific intent requirements in specific substantive sections, its absence in the general sections is less than crucial, except that some reference to it might have addressed the question of whether intent in the narrow, purposive definition of § 302 was meant, or whether knowledge would also suffice. 6 1 H.R. 6915 does generally mention specific intent although it fails to give it a definition.
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III. CONCLUSION
As this article was prepared during the congressional consideration of S. 1722 and H.R. 6915, it was thought that it might be most useful to focus on several problem areas in the legislation. The resulting picture
